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//Lecturer: Dr. Nicola Basilico// | //Lecturer: Dr. Nicola Basilico// | ||
- | This course provides an introduction to multiagent systems by concentrating on modeling agents interactions by means of competitive games. The main objectives of this course are: conveying basic notions of game theoretical models, discussing in detail some of the algorithms for their resolution, and presenting some recent real-world applications. | + | This course provides an introduction to multiagent systems by concentrating on modeling agents interactions by means of competitive games. The main objectives of this course are: conveying basic notions of game theoretical models, discussing in detail some of the algorithms for their resolution, and presenting some recent real-world applications. |
=== Announcements === | === Announcements === | ||
+ | * For non-UNIMI students: when certifying the exam I can recognize additional hours for the final project if required by your PhD School' | ||
+ | * Course notes and other material presented in class have been completely uploaded | ||
* The calendar has been updated: the class of May 10th is postponed to May 25th --- //NB 2016/05/08 13:14// | * The calendar has been updated: the class of May 10th is postponed to May 25th --- //NB 2016/05/08 13:14// | ||
* A [[http:// | * A [[http:// | ||
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=== Syllabus === | === Syllabus === | ||
- Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, self-interested agents, von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and utilities, definition and examples of strategic form games, strategy profiles and expected utility (April 19th, 2016); | - Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, self-interested agents, von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and utilities, definition and examples of strategic form games, strategy profiles and expected utility (April 19th, 2016); | ||
- | - Strategy profiles, strictly competitive games, solution concepts, Pareto efficiency, strict, weak and very weak dominance, dominant strategies, iterated removal of dominated actions (April | + | - Strategy profiles, strictly competitive games, solution concepts, Pareto efficiency, strict, weak and very weak dominance, dominant strategies, iterated removal of dominated actions (April |
- Algorithms for dominance, Nash, Maxmin/ | - Algorithms for dominance, Nash, Maxmin/ | ||
- | - Nash and Maxmin, maxmin/ | + | - Nash and Maxmin, maxmin/ |
- | - Correlated equilibrium, | + | - Correlated equilibrium, |
- | + | ||
- | === Course notes === | + | |
- | // | + | |
- | - Intro: {{: | + | |
- | - Agents: {{: | + | |
- | - Games: {{: | + | |
- | - Concepts (1): {{: | + | |
=== Assignment === | === Assignment === |